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Abstract 
It is a widely held belief among legal theorists that the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in 
criminal trials reduces the likelihood of convicting an innocent defendant. This belief is, to a 
large extent, dependent upon the assumption that all jurors will vote sincerely based on their own 
impression of the trial evidence. Recent literature, however, has drawn this assumption into 
question, and simple models of jury procedure have been constructed in which, except under 
very strict conditions , it is never a Nash equilibrium for all jurors to vote sincerely. Moreover, 
Nash equil ibrium behavior in these models leads to higher probabili ties of both convicting an 
innocent defendant and acquitting a guilty defendant under unanimity rule than under a wide 
variety of alternative voting rules, including simple majority rule. The present paper extends 
these models by adding minimal enhancements that we argue bring the existing models closer to 
actual jury procedures . In particular, we separately analyze the implications of ( 1 ) incorporating 
the possibility of mistrial and (2) al lowing limited communication among jurors. Under each of 
these enhancements , we identify general conditions under which sincere voting is, in fact, a Nash 
equilibrium. We further demonstrate that under such sincere voting equilibria, unanimous jury 
verdicts perform better than any alternative voting rule in terms of minimizing probability of trial 
error and maximizing expected utility. 
In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: 
Mistrials, Communication, and Sincerity* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Peter J. Coughlan** 
It is a widely held belief among legal theorists that the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in 
criminal trials reduces the likelihood of convicting an innocent defendant. This belief is, to a 
large extent, dependent upon the assumption that all jurors will vote sincerely -- that is, if the 
trial evidence leads a juror to believe that the defendant is innocent, the juror will vote to acquit, 
while if the evidence leads a juror to believe that the defendant is guilty, the juror will vote to 
convict. Recent literature, however, has suggested that the assumption of sincere voting by 
jurors may be inconsistent with Nash equilibrium behavior and has thus drawn into question the 
supposed benefits of unanimous jury verdicts. 
The use of juries in criminal trials is based, at least in part, upon the bel ief that, when all 
individuals possess a common preference for selecting the "better" of two alternatives (in this 
case, conviction or acquittal) ,  a group is more likely than any single individual to select the 
preferred option. This is the central argument behind the extensive literature that has developed 
based on Condorcet's Jury Theorem [Condorcet 1 795/ 1 976, Grof man and Feld 1 988, Klevorick, 
Rothschi ld, and Winship 1984, Miller 1 986, and Young 1988]. Analysis and extensions of thi s 
theorem have generally been statistical in nature, however, taking individual probabili ties of 
correct decisions to be exogenously determined [Berg 1993; Ladha 1992, 1 993, 1 995]. An 
implici t element of this approach is the assumption that individuals behave in the same manner 
when they are acting as a dictator as when they are participating in a group decision process. In 
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the framework of jury decision-making, this is equivalent to assuming that jurors vote sincerely 
based on their private information (and perhaps shared public information) . 
In a recent paper, however, Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] i l lustrate that sincere voting in such 
group decisions may be inconsistent with Nash equil ibrium behavior under fairly general 
conditions. In response, McLennan [1996] and Wit [1996] have attempted to rehabil itate the 
central notion of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, by identifying reasonable conditions under which 
Nash equilibrium behavior, though it may be "insincere," stil l predicts that groups are more 
l ikely to make correct decisions than individuals. 
Feddersen and Pesendorfer [ 1997] have adapted the general framework of Austen-Smith and 
Banks to the specific case of jury procedures in criminal trials and, in doing so, have derived 
some surprising results about unanimous jury verdicts. Feddersen and Pesendorfer construet a 
model of the j ury process in which, except under very strict conditions, it i s  never a Nash 
equil ibrium for all jurors to vote sincerely. Moreover, Nash equil ibrium behavior in thi s  model 
leads to higher probabil i ties of both convicting an innocent defendant and acquitting a gui lty 
defendant under unanimity rule than under a wide variety of alternative voting rules , including 
simple majority rule. They conclude that, if their model is accurate, the societal objective of 
avoiding such jury errors may be better served by eliminating the requirement of unanimous 
verdicts in criminal cases. 
The present paper extends the Feddersen and Pesendorfer model by adding certain minimal 
enhancements that we argue bring the model closer to actual jury procedures. In particular, we 
separately ar:ialyze the implications of ( 1 ) incorporating the possibility of mistrial and (2) 
al lowing limited communication among jurors. Under each of these enhancements, we identify 
general condi tions under which sincere voting is , in fact, a Nash equil ibrium. We further 
demonstrate that under such s incere voting equil ibria, the conclusion of the inferiority of 
unanimous jury verdicts does not persi st. That is , if the possibil i ty of either mistrial or limited 
communication is introduced, it is no longer the case that unanimous jury verdicts generally 
produce equi librium probabilities of convicting an innocent defendant and acquitting a guilty 
defendant that are higher than under alternative voting rules. Moreover, within the s incere 
voting equil ibria, unanimity rule maximizes ex ante expected util i ty for al l jurors under these 
model enhancements. 
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2 THE BASIC MODEL 
We first introduce the basic model of jury procedure which was analyzed by Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer and, more generally, by Austen-Smith and Banks. This model will serve as a point 
of departure and source of comparison for the new jury models introduced in this paper. 
2.1 Basic Theoretical Framework 
I t  is assumed that there are n jurors who wil l  vote to determine the fate of a defendant. The set of 
jurors wil l be denoted by N = {1,2, .. . ,n} with an individual juror being represented by jEN. 
There are two possible states of the world: the defendant is either guil ty or innocent. We denote 
by G the s tate of the world in which the defendant is guil ty and by I the state in which the 
defendant is innocent. Each state i s  assumed to occur with equal probabil i ty . 
There are two possible outcomes of the jury vote: the defendant is convicted, denoted C, or the 
defendant i s acquitted, denoted A. Each juror can either vote to convict (C) or acquit (A) the 
defendant. All votes are done by secret ballot and no abstentions are allowed. We wil l  represent 
by I C I the total number of votes for conviction and by J A J the total number of votes for 
acquittal . In addition, JC 1-i will denote the number of votes for conviction among all j urors 
other than j ,  or N/{j}, while J A 1-i will denote the number of votes for acquittal among N/{j}. 
A A 
A voting rule is described by a threshold k, which is an integer between 0 and n. I f  IC J 2:: k the 
defendant is convicted, and the defendant is acquitted otherwise. Unanimity rule is represented A 
by the votin-g rule k = n, while simple majority rule i s represented by the voting rule with k 
equal to the smallest integer greater than n;2. 
The impact of the trial evidence is represented by a private signal received by each juror. We 
will denote by � the signal received by juror j .  There are two possible signals, g or i ,  and the 
signal is correlated with the true state of the world. In particular, for all j, Prob(si=g I G) = 
Prob(si=i I I) = pE(0.5, 1 .0) . Thus, the parameter p is the probabil i ty that a juror receives the 
"correct" signal (g in state G and i in state I) and 1-p is the probabil i ty that the juror receives the 
"incorrect" signal (i in state G and g in state I ). We wil l denote by I g J the total number of g 
signals received and by Ji J the total number of i signals received. In addition, Jg 1-i will denote 
the number of g signals among N/{j} while Ji 1-i wil l denote the number of i signals among 
N/{j}. 
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Note that, although juror signals are drawn independently given the true state of the world, they 
are correlated to each other in the sense that Prob(sj=g I si=g) = Prob(sj=i I s;=i) = p2+( 1-p)2 > 112 
> 2p( 1 -p) = Prob(sj=g I si=i) = Prob(sj=i I si=g). I n  other words, juror i's signal provides her 
information about juror j's signal and, in particular, she believes that juror j is more likely to 
have a signal that matches her own signal than one that does not. 
Let °:J(O,S) be juror j's util ity given outcome 0 in state S. I t  is assumed that u/C,G) = �(A,l) = 
0, u/C,I) = -qi, and ui(A,G) = -( 1 -q) where qiE(0, 1). Note that, with this construction, any juror j 
will prefer conviction to acquittal whenever she believes the probabil i ty that the defendant is 
gui lty is greater than qi. In this sense, 1-qi i s  a measure of what juror j considers to be 
"reasonable doubt." Also note that the analysis of the basic model presented by Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer uses common utilities ( i .e. CL=qi for all i ,jEN), although they state that this is purely 
for technical convenience. To assure the generality of our results , we wil l use individual utilities 
in all of our analysis. 
We will denote by f)(k,n) the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty conditional on k of 
n guilty signals: 
(3( k, n) 
It is assumed that for all jEN, there is a k* with n;;:::k';d such that �(k'-1,n) :S q j :S !)(k*,n). This 
;:i.ssumption rules out jurors who will always want to convict or always want to acquit the 
defendant regardless of the number of innocent and guilty signals. Thus, if it is known that lgl=n, 
all jurors wi ll want to convict the defendant, while if it is known that lil=n, all jurors will want to 
acquit the defendant. 
The behavior of a given juror j is described by a strategy mapping,�: (O,l)x{g,i} -- [0, 1], with 
o/qi,s) being the probability of voting to convict given util i ty parameter qi and signal s j" Sincere 
voting is defined as voting to convict whenever a guilty signal is received and voting to acquit 
whenever an innocent signal is received. In other words, the sincere voting strategy for juror j is 
given by: 
= 
{ 1 if s i = g 
0 if Si = i 
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Note that sincere voting, defined in this manner, is a naive form of voting, since "voting one's 
signal" may be inconsistent with expected utility maximization for some jurors. For this reason, 
we also define sophisticated sincere voting. A strategy for juror j is considered sophisticated 
sincere voting when it consists of voting for the trial outcome which maximizes her expected 
payoff conditional on her signal and any other revealed signals. Thus, the general form of the 
sophisticated sincere voting strategy for juror j is given by: 
If juror j knows only signal sj, her sophisticated sincere voting strategy becomes : 
I f  all n signals are revealed, the sophisticated sincere voting strategy for juror j is given by: 
2.2 Assumptions and Conclusions of the Basic Model 
I n  analyzing this basic model , Feddersen and Pesendorfer make several assumptions to eliminate 
potential equilibria that do not satisfy certain normative criteria. In particular, they eliminate 
from consideration asymmetric equil ibria and equi libria in which a juror's strategy i s 
independent of the signal received. Certain restrictions are also placed upon the relationship 
between the parameters p and qj. In particular, it is assumed for al l jEN that 
o-2 
1- p :S qj :S �( n - 1 , n ) = o-2 
p 
o-2 p + ( 1- p) 
The lower bound on qj above is not particularly restrictive. To see this ,  note that violation of this 
bound means that qj < 1-p < 0.5, and therefore that juror j prefers to convict even in cases where 
it is more likely that the defendant i s  innocent. Such juror preferences should rarely, if ever, 
exist, and thus requiring qj to be greater than 1-p is a reasonable restriction. The upper bound on 
qi is also relatively permissive. This bound says only that n- 1 guilty signals (versus only one 
innocent signal) would be sufficient information for all jurors to prefer conviction. 
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With these assumptions placed on the basic model , Feddersen and Pesendorf er demonstrated 
that, for any voting rule k ,  there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in which all jurors vote 
sincerely and that there is instead a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Moreover, as the size of 
the jury increases towards infinity, equilibrium behavior under unanimity rule will lead to higher 
probabil i ties of both convicting an innocent defendant and acquitting a guilty defendant than 
under non-unanimous voting rules. Feddersen and Pesendorfer also show by example (n=l2, 
p=0.8, and qi=0.9 for all j) that this relationship can hold for smaller juries under fairly 
reasonable conditions (including k > n/2). 
The key to understanding these somewhat surprising results i s to recognize that each juror will 
condition her strategy on the event that she i s  pivotal. In other words, each juror will behave as 
if she knew that her vote would determine the outcome of the trial. In the case of unanimity rule , 
thi s  means that each juror will behave as if all other jurors are voting to convict the defendant. It 
is therefore not difficult to see that, regardless of one 's own signal, being pivotal provides a 
strong incentive to vote for conviction since all other jurors are doing the same. 
For non-unanimous rules, on the other hand, being pivotal may provide much less compelling 
information. For simple majority rule (with n odd) , being pivotal means only that an equal 
number of the other jurors are voting in each direction. This infonnation is not overwhelming 
for either guilt or innocence, and can therefore be expected to have much less influence on juror 
voting. 
To expl icitly demonstrate that sincere voting is not a Nash equilbrium under unanimity rule, 
suppose that all jurors do vote sincerely and consider the situation in which juror j receives an 
innocent signal ( si=i). It i s  easy to see that juror j has a positive incentive to deviate from 
sincerity and vote to convict in thi s case. First note that since j uror j will condition her vote on 
being pivotal, she will behave as if all other jurors are voting to convict. When jurors vote 
sincerely, this means that all other n-1 jurors received guilty signals and that juror j received the 
only innocent signal. Juror j ' s  perceived probability of gui lt i s  therefore (3(n-l,n) in thi s  case. 
However, by assumption, qi :::;; (3 (n-l ,n) and thus juror j prefers conviction to acquittal. Hence, 
juror j has an incentive to deviate from sincerity, and therefore sincere voting is not a Nash 
equilibrium under unanimity rule in the basic model. 
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3 THE MISTRIAL MODEL 
The first significant limitation of the basic model involves the delineation of trial outcomes. The 
basic model assumes that there are only two possible outcomes of the jury process: conviction or 
acquittal . Under unanimity rule , for example, a defendant is convicted if and only if all j urors 
vote for conviction, and the defendant is acquitted otherwise. In actual practice; however, almost 
all jurisdictions require unanimity to either convict or acquit a defendant in a criminal trial (see 
Schwartz and Schwartz 1 992). If the jury vote results in neither a unanimous vote to convict nor 
a unanimous vote to acquit, then there i s a "hung j ury." If the hung jury situation persists 
through del iberations, a mistrial is declared and a new trial can be expected to take place. If the 
jury process is to be represented by a single vote, any non-unanimous vote would then 
immediately result in a mistrial . 
3.1 Existence of Sincere Voting Equilibria with Exogenous Mistrial Utilities 
Thus, consider an enhancement to the basic model in which there are three possible outcomes of 
the jury process : the defendant is convicted (C), the defendant i s acquitted (A) , or a mistrial is A A 
declared (M). A voting rule i s sti l l  described by a threshold k, however k must now be an A A 
integer between n;2 and n. If I C  I ;:::: k the defendant i s convicted, if I A I ;:::: k the defendant i s  
acquitted, and a mistrial is declared otherwise. Note that k must be strictly greater than n/i, A A 
because if k = n;2 then the trial outcome is indeterminate when I C  I = I A I = k .  
Let u/M,G) = -m  � u/M,I) = -m �· We will make the natural assumption that the util ity of a 
mistrial is strictly between the uti l ities of acquittal and conviction. That is , 0 < m � < qi and 0 < 
m � < (1-q) . In the next section, we will endogenize these mistrial uti l i ties by equating them 
with the expected value of a new trial in a repeated trial process . For now, however, it i s  
instructi ve to consider these mistrial util ities as exogenously determined. 
Before proceeeding, it should be noted that Schwartz and Schwartz ( 1992) have also analyzed 
the impact of alternative voting rules within a model of jury procedure allowing for the 
possibil ity of mistrial . The Schwartz model , however, takes a very different approach, in which 
jurors have single-peaked preferences over a range of possible charges and the key choice 
variable is the prosecutorial decision about which charge (or charges) to prosecute . 
The first result in the analysis of the current "mistrial model" presents the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for sincere voting to be a Nash equilibrium. 
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Proposition 1: Suppose that n is odd and that k = n;1 (simple majority rule). In this case, 
sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium in the mistrial model if and only if 1 -p s qj s p for any juror 
jEN. In all other cases , sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for any juror jEN: 
(a) (p -qJ(1-p)2k-n-l + ( mfp -mf (1- p)x p2k-n-1 -( 1-p rk-n-1) <:: 0 and 
(b) (P -(1-qi))(l-p)2f-n-1 +(mfp -mf (l-p))(P2k-n-1 -(1-p)2k-n-1) <:: 0. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The key element in the proof of Proposition 1 that distinguishes the predictions of the mistrial 
model from the predictions of the basic model is the understanding of what it means to be pivotal 
in the two different models. To illustrate the distinction, consider the case of unanimity rule. In 
the basic model under unanimity rule, a juror is pivotal only when all other jurors are voting to 
convict. This provides a strong incentive to vote for conviction, even for those jurors who 
receive an innocent signal . In the mistrial model, on the other hand, a juror is pivotal in two 
different cases: when all other jurors are voting to convict and when all other jurors are voting to 
acquit. Moreover, given an innocent signal in the mistrial model, a juror will believe that it is 
more likely that all other jurors are voting to acquit than that all other jurors are voting to 
convict. This provides such a juror a greater incentive to vote sincerely. The same is true for 
jurors who receive a guilty signal. 
Although the conditions of Proposition 1 are fairly general, the structure of the inequalities in the 
proposition makes it difficult to immediately characterize all of the parameter values for which 
the proposi tion is satisfied. It is therefore helpful to examine more straightforward conditions 
that are simply sufficient (but not necessary) for sincere voting to be a Nash equilibrium in the 
mistrial model. 
One set of such sufficient conditions is the following: 
1- p 1- p s q j s p and s p 
p 
1 - p 
These conditions indicate that sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium whenever: (a) the util i ty of 
the two "incorrect" trial outcomes (convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty) are not 
significantly different, and (b) the utility of the two mistrial outcomes are not significantly 
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different. Depending upon the value of p, these conditions can be very general or rather 
restrictive, but they nonetheless illustrate that many non-trivial parameter values wil l  satisfy 
Proposition 1 .  
It is important to note, however, that there are many parameter values that satisfy the conditions 
of Proposition 1 yet do not satisfy the easy-to-understand sufficient conditions specified above. 
For example , consider the Feddersen and Pesendorfer example in which n= 12, p=0.8, and qj=0.9 
for all j (note that this example violates the above conditions). Under unanimity rule in this case , 







< 4 .  
This means that sincere voting will be a Nash equilibrium for this example so long as the utility 
(or disutili ty) of one mistrial outcome is not more than four times as large as the utility (or 
disutility) of the other mistrial outcome. 
Further recognize that the existence of the sincere voting Nash equilibrium in thi s model once 
again does not require that juror utilities be common knowledge. Instead, it is sufficient for a 
given juror to know only her own utility function and that the other jurors vote sincerely (or, 
al ternatively, that the other juror utilities satisfy conditions (a) and (b) of the proposition). 
3.2 Existem;e of Sincere Voting Equilibria with Endogenous Mistrial Utilities 
Tc) further develop this mistrial model, we would like to endogenize the mistrial utilities ,  m � 
and m �, by specifying juror perceptions about the consequences of mistrial. These perceptions 
might incorporate many different factors, but it seems reasonable to model the utility of mistrial 
as s imply the expected utility of an additional trial before a new jury. *  In other words, we have: 
* 
m�' = (1 - qJ Prob5(A I G) + m� · Prob5(M I G) 
m: = qi· Probs(c I I )+ m� · Prob5(M I I) 
We could also discount the expected utility of future trials or apply a fized costldisutility to each new trial. 
�1istrial utilities incorporating these factors still allow us to calculate refined necessary and sufficient conditions for 
sincere voting, however analysis of such utility structures significantly increases the complexity of the presentation 
while providing minimal additional insight. 
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where Prob8(0 IS) is the probability of outcome 0 in a single trial when the state of the world is 
S. 
When the utility of mistrial is specified in this manner, the conditions for the existence of a 
sincere voting Nash equilibrium are simplified significantly: 
Proposition 2: Suppose that the utility of mistrial is equal to the expected utility of an additional 
trial before a new jury. Sincere voting is then a Nash equilibrium in the mistrial model for any 
voting rule k if and only if 1 -p:::;; qj:::;; p for all jEN. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Note that Propositions 1 and 2 both suggest that the occurrence of sincere voting among jurors 
may increase as the "accuracy" of trials improves. As p increases , and thus trials become more 
truth revealing, all of the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 become easier to satisfy, and thus 
sincere voting Nash equilibria will exist for more juries and more trials. This provides an 
additional argument for legal reforms that may be expected to improve the likelihood that the 
true state of the world, guilt or innocence, is revealed at trial. 
It is helpful to discuss further the condition 1-p :::;; q i :::;; p from Proposi tion 2, because this 
condition will appear again later in the paper. This constraint can be interpreted as the "one-man 
jury condition," because it is the same condition that would be required for a one-man jury to 
ever render a meanin_gful verdict. To see this ,  consider a jury consisting of a single juror j. If qj 
:::;; 1-p, then all defendants will be convicted, no matter which signal is received by juror j. 
Similarly, if p:::;; qi , then all defendants will be acquitted, no matter which signal is received by 
juror j. Thus , for this one-man jury to ever render a meaningful verdict (i.e. , one that varies 
depending upon what happens at trial) , it must be the case that 1-p:::;; qi :::;; p. 
3.3 Comparison of Alternative Voting Rules 
Once the existence of sincere voting Nash equilibria is established, it is important to compare the 
performance of alternative voting rules in tenns equilibrium outcomes. One possible 
performance measure is the probability of a trial error, in other words, the probability of 
convicting an innocent defendant or acquitting a guilty defendant. Proposition 3 indicates that 
the probabilities of convicting an innocent defendant and acquitting a guilty defendant both 
decrease as k , the number of votes required for a verdict, increases. 
1 0  
Proposition 3: Suppose that mistrial always results in a new trial and consider two voting rules, 
k1 and k2, with k1 < k2. If jurors vote sincerely, then: 
( 1 ) The probability of convicting an innocent defendant i s  lower under voting rule k2 than under 
voting rule k1• 
(2) The probabil i ty of acquitting a guilty defendant is lower under voting rule k2 than under 
voting rule k1• 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Note that Proposition 3 implies that the probabil i ty of trial error is uniquely minimized by 
unanimity rule and uniquely maximized by simple majority rule. This result is in stark contrast 
to the conclusions from analysis of the basic model , in which Nash equilibrium behavior 
produced higher probabil ities of both convicting an innocent defendant and acquitting a guilty 
defendant under unanimity rule than under any non-unanimous voting rule. 
Another reasonable measure of the performance of alternative voting rules is m terms of 
expected util ity. Our final result for the mistrial model , indicates that the expected utility for any 
juror increases as the number of votes required for a verdict increases. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that the utility of mistrial is equal to the expected utility of an additional ,.. "' ...... ,.. 
trial before a new jury and consider two voting rules, k1 and k2 , with k1 < k2 . If jurors vote 
sincerely, then the ex ante expected util ity for an juror is higher under voting rule k2 than under 
voting rule k1. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
This proposition indicates that unanimity rule again performs uniquely best among all voting 
rules, thi s  time in terms of maximizing expected uti lity. Moreover, Proposition 4 also implies 
that simple majority rule is again the uniquely worst voting rule under this performance measure. 
While both Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 specifically apply to the version of the mistrial 
model in which mistrial uti l ities are determined endogenously, it is important to note that the 
basic results (i.e. unanimity rule minimizing error and maximizing utility) also hold true when 
mistrial util ities are specified exogenously. However, the analysis in the exogenous utili ty case 
is rather simple, and the appropriate interpretation of the results is less clear. 
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4 THE COMMUNICATION MODEL 
Recall that the basic model effectively rules out any communication among jurors in that the 
entire jury process is assumed to be a single vote in which each j uror has no information about 
the beliefs of other jurors. Let us therefore now consider a different enhancement to the basic 
model allowing for minimal communication among jurors. 
In particular, suppose that the jury takes a single non-binding "straw vote" before taking the final 
binding vote for conviction or acquittal. All"jurors must vote to either convict (C) or acquit (A) 
in both the preliminary and final vote, and the number of preliminary votes cast for each 
outcome are announced prior to conducting the final vote. It is assumed that no communication 
other than casting the anonymous preliminary vote takes place. 
Note that this enhancement to the model is not meant to represent actual deliberation procedures , 
but is nonetheless intended to show the significance of including communication in any model of 
the jury process. The incorporation of a single non-binding straw-vote will demonstrate that the 
addition of even the most minimal communication can significantly change the conclusions of 
the model analysis. 
4.1 Existence of Sincere Voting Equilibria 
We start our analysis of this "communication model" by adapting our notion of sincerity to the 
distinctive voting framework of the model. The sincere revelation strategy profile for the 
communication model consists of each juror j voting according to the following guidelines: 
( 1 )  In the preliminary vote, juror j votes to convict iff si=g (sincere voting); 
(2) In the final vote, juror j votes to convict iff !)(k,n)� qi where k is the number of votes to 
convict from the preliminary vote (sophisticated sincere voting) ; 
Our first result for the communication model identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the sincere revelation strategy profile to constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilbrium. 
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Proposition 5: Let the jurors be numbered such that q1 � 'h � ... � q,,_1 � q0• Then the s incere 
revelation strategy profile i s  a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a given voting rule k if and 
only if one of the following conditions is true: 
(a) 0 � q k � f3(0,n); 
(b) j3(n,n) < qk � 1; or 
(c) 3k*E{l, . . . , n} such that j3(k*- l ,n) � qj � f3(k' ,n) for all jEN. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 5 says that s incerity is a Nash equilibrium in the communication model whenever 
j uror utilities satisfy a certain "closeness" condition. The basic insight behind this proposition i s 
that when juror utilities are similar enough for there to be a situation of "common interest," 
everyone can benefit from an honest sharing of information in the preliminary vote. Since j urors 
do not have competing interests, the sharing of information can only serve to enhance the 
probability of achieving the outcome that all jurors prefer. In fact, the basic results of 
Proposition 5 should hold for any game of incomplete information and common interest in which 
a choice must be made between two alternatives, such as between two candidates for office or 
two public projects. Also recognize that the existence of the sincere voting Nash equilibrium in 
this communication model does not require that juror utili ties be common knowledge. Instead, i t  
is sufficient for jurors to know only that the other jurors are following the sincere revelation 
strategy profile (or, al ternatively, that one of the three conditions , (a) , (b) ,  or (c) , is true). 
One simple si tuation that meets the conditions of the proposition is the case of common utili ties 
( i.e. , when qi=qi for all i ,jENj. Thus, in Feddersen and Pesendorfer's example where n= l2, 
p=0.8, and qi=0.9 for all j, sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium in the communication model 
under all possible voting rules. It is important to note, however, that it is possible for juror 
utili ties to differ significantly and sti ll satisfy the conditions of the proposition. Consider the 
case of a three-person jury (n=3) , and suppose a correct signal is received 80% of the time 
(p=0.8). In this case, we have f3(0,3)=0.0 15, f3( 1 ,3)=0.200, f3(2,3)=0.800, and (3(3,3)=0.985. 
Since I-qi is a measure of reasonable doubt, we would l ike to think that qi�0.5 for all j, and it is 
not unreasonable to suppose that 0.200 � � � 0.800 or 0.800 �qi� 0.985 for all j . If all q j values 
fall in either of these ranges, Proposition 5 says that sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium. While 
the second range is narrower than the first range, it may be more realistic, and still allows the 
reasonable doubt threshold to vary from 1-in-4 to about 1 -in-70. 
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It may at first seem that as n increases (i .e . , the size of the jury becomes larger) , the difference 
between (3(k' - 1 ,n) and (3 (k* ,n) will become smaller for all k'E{l, ... , n}, making the conditions of 
Proposi tion 1 increasingly difficult to satisfy. This is not entirely true, however. In fact, some of 
these differences remain constant (and potentially rather large) for all values of n. Our next 
proposition uses this fact to identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a sincere voting 
equilibrium that_ are independent of the size of the j ury. 
Proposition 6: For n odd, the sincere revelation strategy profile i s  a subgame perfect Nash A 
equilibrium for any voting rule k if: 
For n even, the sincere revelation strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for any A 
voting rule k if: 
( 1 - p)2 
s qj s 0.5, 'v'j EN p2 + ( 1 - p)2 
2 
or 0.5 s qj s 
p 
2 , 'v'j EN .  p2 + ( 1 - p) 
For any value of n, odd or even, the sincere revelation strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash A 
equilibrium for any voting rule k if: 
Proof: See Appendix. 
To better understand the scope of the conditions in Proposition 6, consider the moderate case of 
p=0.8. Proposition 2 then says that, if there are an odd number of jurors (whether there be three 
jurors , 1 1  jurors , or 99 jurors) , the sincere revelation strategy profile will be a Nash equilibrium 
for any voting rule whenever 0.2 ::s; qj ::s; 0.8 for all jurors jEN. In addition, if there are an even 
number of jurors (whether there be 4 jurors, 12 jurors, or 100 jurors), such sincere voting will be 
a Nash equilibrium for any voting rule whenever all juror utilities satisfy either 0.06 ::s; qj ::s; 0.5 or 
0.5 ::s; qj ::s; 0.94. Moreover, if 0.2 ::s; qj ::s; 0.5 for all jurors or 0.5 ::s; qj ::s; 0.8 for all jurors , sincere 
voting will be a Nash equilibrium for a jury of any size, odd or even. This example demonstrates 
that strategic jurors may vote sincerely in equilibrium under fairly general conditions for all 
juries and all voting rules .  
Note that Propositions 6 suggests that the occurrence of sincere voting among jurors in the 
communication model may increase as the "accuracy" of trials improves. We observed the same 
14 
result in our analysis of the mistrial model . As p increases ,  and thus trials become more truth 
revealing, the conditions of Proposition 6 become easier to satisfy, and thus sincere voting Nash 
equil ibria will exist for more juries and more trials . Also note that the "one-man jury condition," 
discussed previously, once again appears in Proposition 6. 
Our next result for the communication model follows directly from Proposition 5. 
Proposition 7: Suppose the juror util ities satisfy 0.5 s q1 s q2 s ... s qn-t s qn. If condition (a), 
(b), or (c) from Proposition 5 is satisfied under voting rule k1, then the same condition is A A A 
satisfied under any other voting rule k2 satisfying k 2 > k1 • 
Proof: See Appendix. 
This proposition indicates that, as long as qj�0 .5 for all j (as we would expect), sincere voting i s  
more likely to be a Nash equilibrium under unanimity rule than under any alternative voting rule. 
4.2 Comparison of Alternative Voting Rules 
We evaluate the performance of alternative voting rules in the communication model by once 
again examining the probabi lity of trial error under different rules . 
Proposition 8: Suppose that the sincere revelation strategy profile i s  a subgame perfect Nash A A 
equi l ibrium for two voting rules, k1 and k 2 • I f  jurors behave according to this Nash equilibrium, 
then: 
( 1) The probabi l i ty of convicting an innocent defendant is the same under both voting rules . 
(2) The probabi l ity of acquitting a guilty defendant is the same under both voting rules . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposi tion 8 indicates that the smcere revelation Nash equilibrium results in the same 
probabil ity of trial error under all voting rules. Thus, our conclusions once again contrast with 
the results from analysis of the basic model, in which unanimous jury verdicts were shown to be 
uniquely inferior under this performance measure. 
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Applying the alternative criterion of expected uti l ity maximization, our results once agam 
conflict with the negative assessment of unanimity rule from the analysis of the basic model. 
Instead, Proposition 9 indicates that the sincere revelation Nash equil ibrium in the 
communication model produces the same expected uti l i ty under all voting rules . 
Proposition 9: Suppose the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists 
for any two voting rules, k1 and k2• If jurors behave according to this Nash equil ibrium, then 
the expected utility for any juror i s  the same under both voting rules . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
Analysis of the basic model of j ury procedure produces the somewhat surprising result that 
sincere voting can never be a Nash equilibrium for any voting rule ,  unless extreme restrictions 
are imposed. Instead, a mixed strategy equil ibrium exists in which unanimous jury verdicts are 
uniquely inferior in terms of minimizing the probability of trial error. 
The objective of the current paper was to evaluate the impact that certain extensions of thi s basic 
model have on the existence of sincere voting Nash equilibria. In particular, we examined the 
effects of introducing the possibi l i ty of mistrial and allowing l imited communication upon the 
. incentives for jurors_ to vote sincerely. In both cases , we find non-trivial conditions under which 
sincere voting is indeed a Nash equilibrium. In addition, we compare the outcomes of these 
sincere voting Nash equilibria under alternative voting rules and demonstrate that unanimity rule 
minimizes the probability of trial error and maximizes the ex ante expected util ity of jurors. 
An additional implication of the results of this paper is that the generality of sincere voting 
equil ibria is strongly dependent upon the "accuracy" of trial s .  In particular, as the probabi l ity 
that the true state of the world is revealed at trial increases, the conditions for the existence of a 
sincere voting Nash equil ibrium become more general in both the mistrial model and the 
communication model . This provides an additional argument in support of any legal reform that 
can be shown to produce more accurate impressions of guilt or innocence at trial . 
While this paper was concerned only with the existence of pure strategy sincere voting Nash 
equi l ibria, the investigation of the impacts of mistrial and communication should be extended to 
1 6  
examine the existence and impl ications of mixed strategy and other non-sincere Nash equilibria. 
In particular, it is important to determine what happens when the conditions for existence of 
sincere voting Nash equilibria that are identified in this paper are violated. Do the equi libria that 
exist in such situations sti l l produce outcomes that make unanimity rule superior in terms of 
minimizing error and maximizing utility? Or do the results of the basic model prevai l ,  with 
unanimity rule being outperformed by other voting rules such as simple majority rule? 
There are several other more basic extensions that should also be investigated to enhance the 
generali ty of these jury procedure models .  For example, the prior probabil ity of guilt or 
innocence i s  assumed to be 50% in  all models, however empirical evidence, such as conviction 
rates, suggests that this probabil ity may be closer to 80% or even 90%. Moreover, estimates of 
this prior probability may differ among jurors. It would be interesting to examine the impact of 
varying this parameter. Additionally, all of the models presented in this paper include the 
restriction that the uti l ity of the two correct trial outcomes, convicting the guilty and acquitting 
the innocent, are equal. Any generalization of these models should examine the effect of 
loosening this restriction as well. 
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Proposition 1: Suppose that n is odd and that k = n;1 (simple majority rule). In this case, 
sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium in the mistrial model if and only if 1 -p =::; qi =::; p for any juror 
jEN. In all other cases, sincere voting is a Nash equil ibrium if and only if, for any juror j EN: 
(a) (p-qi)(1-p)2k-n-1 +(mfp-mf(1-p)Xp 2i<-n-1 -(1-p)2i<-n-1) <!: o and 
(b) (p-(l-qj)J(l-p)2k-n-1 +(mfp-mf(l-p))(p2k-n-l -(l-p)2k-n-1) <!: O. 
Proof: We will prove the second part of the proposition first. 
Case 1 :  n is even and/or k ;e. n;1 
Again recognize that a strategic voter will condition her strategy on the event that her vote is 
pivotal; that is , that her vote can change the trial outcome. For a given juror j ,  there are exactly 
four scenarios in which her vote is pivotal in this case: 
( 1 )  Defendant is guil ty and k-1 other jurors vote to convict ( G n ICl _ i = k - 1 ) 
(2) Defendant is guilty and k-1 other jurors vote to acquit ( G n IA Li = k - 1 ) 
(3) Defendant is innocent and k-1 other jurors vote to convict (1 n jcl_i = k - 1 ) 
(4) Defendant is innocent and k-1 other jurors vote to acquit (1 n IA.Li = k -1) 
Juror j's beliefs about the relative likelihood of each of these four scenarios wil l  help determine 
her util ity maximizing strategy. In particular, for any juror j, the expected util ity of a vote to 
convict (ignoring the event in which the vote is not pivotal) is given by: 
EUj(c,sj) = Prob(G n ICLj = k-l)·uj(C,G) + Prob(G n IALj = k-l)·uj(M.G ) 
+ Pro�I n jel_j =k-l)·u/C,I) + Pro�I n IAl_j =k-l)·uj(M,I) 
= -qJ·Prob(I n ICLi=k-1)- m�·Pro�G n IALi=k-1) 
- mJ·Prob(I n IALi = k-1) 
Similarly , the expected uti l i ty of a vote to acquit is given by: 
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EUi (A,si ) = Pr o�G n ICl-j = k-l)·uj(MG) + Prob(G n IAl-1 = k-l)·uj(A,G) 
+ Prob(I n ICLJ = k-l)·ul(MI) + Pr o�I n IAl_j = k-l)·ul(A,I) 
= - ( 1-q J · Prob( G n IAL1 = k -1) - m � · Prob( G n ICL 3 = k -1 ) 
- m� ·Prob( I n ICl_1 = k -1) 
Now suppose all j urors vote sincerely. That is, Oj(g) = 1 and Oj(i) = 0 for all j, and thus IC I = 
I g I and I A I = Ii j. We must show that no juror can increase his or her utility by deviating 
from this strategy. More specifically, for all jEN, we must show that: 
(1) I f  si = g, then EUi(C,g);:::: EU/A,g) 
(2) I f  si = i ,  then EU/A,i) ;:: EU/C,i) 
Subcase 1 :  si = g 
In this subcase, juror j's beliefs about the probabil ity of the first scenario in which her vote is 




where lIJ (n - 1)! 
Pro�G n lgl= k: n si = g) 
Prob(si = g ) 
Pro�G) · Pro� jgl = k j G) · Pro�si = g I lgl = k) 
Prob(G)·Pro�sj = g Io)+ Prob(I)·Prob(sj = g I 1) 
1 n! k(l )n-k k -· ·p - p ·-
2 k!{n - k:)! n 
1 l -·p+ -· (1- p) 
2 2 
2 1 
I n  the same manner, we can show that: 
i..{ 1 1 A I ) n k +l ( ) k-1 Pr o\ G n A - i = k - 1 si = g = w · p - 1 - p 
Pr o�I n ICl_j = k - 1 l s j = g) = W · pn-k (l - p) k 
( I I A I ) k_ 1 ( ) n-k+l Pr ob I n A -i = k - 1 s i = g = W · p - 1 - p 
Thus, the expected utility of a vote to convict is given by: 
EUj (C , g) = - q i Prob(I n ICLi = k - 1 )  - m f Pr ob(G n IALJ = k - 1) 
- m � Prob( I n IALJ = k - 1) 
uJ n- k ( l ) k  G n-k+l (l ) k- 1 I k- 1 (l ) n-k +1 ] = - " lqi p - p + m i p - p + mip - p 
Similarly, the expected util ity of a vote to acquit is given by: 
EU1 (A, g) = - (l - q 1 ) Prob(G n !ALi = k - 1) - mf Pr ob(c n 1q_ i = k - 1) 
- mf Prob( I n IC1 _1 = k - 1) 
= - w [(1 - q l )p n- k+l ( 1 - p )k - 1 + mfpk ( l - p r- k  + m� p n-k ( l - p ) k ] 
Condition (a) � (p - q 1 )(1 - p)2 k -n - l + (m f p -m/ ( l - p))( P2k -n - 1 - ( 1 - p) 2f -n-I ) � O 
� (P _ q 1p x 1 _ p ) 2k- n� 1  + m�p (p2k- n -l _ ( 1 _ p ) 2k- n-1 ) 
( )( ) 2k -n - 1 ] ( )( 2k n 1 ( )2k- n- 1 ) � q 1 - q ip 1 - p  + m 1 1 - p  p - - - 1 - p  
� (1 - q i )p (l - p) 2k -n - 1 +m � p2k-n + m; ( 1 - p fk-n . . 
� q Jl - p) 2k -n + mfp (l - p) 2 k- n- 1 + mfp 2k -n - l (l - p) 
� (1 - q 1 )p n- k+ 1 (1 - p ) ic-1 + mf;p k (l - pr- f + m\ p n -k ( l - pt 
� q ip n- f (l - P) f + mf pn -f +1 (l - p) f- 1 + m� p f -1 (l - pf-k.+1 
� - w [qi p n -k ( l - p )f + mf;p n-k+1 ( l - p )f - 1 +mfp k-1 ( 1 - pf-f +1 J 
� _ W [ ( l - q 1 )P n-k + 1 ( l _ p) k- 1 + m f p k_  ( l - p) n -k + m f p n- k ( l _ p ) k J 
� EU 1 ( C, g) � EU1 (A ,g)  
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Subcase 2: s .  = 1 
J 
For this subcase, we can calculate juror j ' s  bel iefs about the relative probabilities of the four 
scenarios in which her vote is pivotal in the same manner as above. This gives us: 
Pr ob( a n  lcLj = k - �  s j  = i )  = W · pk -1 (1 - pr-k+i 
Pr ob(G n IA.Li = k - 11 S i = i ) = 'P · pn- k (1 - pt 
Pr ob(I n ICLi = k - l l si = i) = W · pn-k+l ( l - p) k-l 
Pr ob( 1 n IALj = k - ll si = i) = W · pk (1 - pr-k 
(n - 1 )1 where W = · 
2 · ( k - 1 )! { n - k )! 
Thus, the expected util ity of a vote to convict is given by: 
EUJ (C , i )  = - qi Prob( I n  ICLj = k - 1) - mf Prob(G n IALj = k - 1) 
- m :  Prob( I n IAL1 = k - 1 ) 
uJ n-k+l( )k-1 G n-k ( ) k I k ( ) n-k ] = - -r lq i p 1 - p  +m i p 1 - p + m1 p 1 - p 
Similarly , the expected util ity of a vote to acqui t is given by: 
EU 1 (A , i )  = - ( l -q 1 ) Pr ob(G n IA l_1 = k - 1) - mf Pr ob(G n IQ_ i = k. - 1) 
- m '.  Prob(I n lcl_1 = k - 1 ) 
_ nJ(l ) n-k  (l ) k G k-1 (J ) n-k+I I n -k+ l (l ) k -1 ] - - 't l  - q 1 p - p + m1 p - p + mi p - p  
Condi tion (b) � (P - (1 - qi ))(l - p)2 k- n-l + ( m�p - m�' (1 - p) )(p2k- n-l - (1 - p )2k -n -l ) � O 
( 1 )2k -n - 1 I ( 2k- n- 1 (l )2k -n - 1 ) ¢::> q ip - p + mi p p - - p 
(1 )( )2 k- n- 1 G ( )( zk-n-1 ( )2k- n -1 ) � - qi - p + qi p 1 - p + mi 1 - p p - 1 - p 
(1 )2k -n - 1 G ( l ) 2k-n I 2k - n � q ip - p + m i - p + m i p 
� (1 - qJ(l - p) 2k- n + m�p 2k -n - 1 (1 - p) + mlp(l - p )2
k -n - 1 
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� qipi-f + i (l - p )
k






( l - pf-
IC 
� (l - qi ) Pn- k(l - p )
k 
+ mf pk-l (l _ pf-k +J + mJpn -k+l (l - p)k - 1 
� _ �(l - qJpn- k (l - p) k + mf p
k
-l(l - p y-
k
+l + m� pn -k + I(l - p )k- 1 ] 
u[ n- k+l ( l \k - 1 G n -k (l )k I k (l ) n-k ] � - " lq ip - Pl + � p - p +m ip - p 
� EUi (A , i )  � EUlC, i )  
Case 2 :  n i s odd and k = n;1 
Note that there can never be a mistrial in this case. If I C  I � 0;1 ,  the defendant is 
convicted, while if I c I < n ;1 (i.e ., I c I � n ;1 -1 =n- n ;1 ), the defendant is acquitted. We also 
have that I C  1 -.F k:.: 1 � I A 1 -i= k- 1 .  Therefore, to be pivotal in this case is to decide between 
conviction and acquittal (as opposed to conviction and mistrial or acquittal and mistrial as 
above) . Each juror is therefore concerned only with the relative likelihood of two possible 
scenarios: the defendant is guilty or the defendant is innocent. 
Thus, for any juror j ,  the expected uti l i ty of a vote to convict is given by: 
EU i (C , s i ) = Pr ob(G) · u i (C , G) + Pr ob(I) · u i ( C.. I) 
- q i  Prob(I) 
Similarly, the expected uti l ity of a vote to acqui t i s given by: 
EUi (A , s J ) = Prob(G)· u i (A , G) + Pr ob(I) · u i (A, I) 
- (1 - q J )Prob(G) 
Now suppose all jurors vote sincerely. That is , Oj(g) = 1 and Oj(i) = 0 for all j ,  and thus I C  I = 
I g I and I A I = I i  I ·  We must show that no juror can increase his or her uti l i ty by deviating 
from this strategy. More specifical ly , for al l jEN, we must show that: 
( 1 )  I f  si = g, then EU/C,g) � EUi(A,g) 
(2) I f  si  = i ,  then EU/A,i) � EUi(C,i) 
Subcase 1 :  si = g 
In this subcase, juror j ' s  beliefs about the probabil i ty of guilt or innocence are given by: 
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Prob(G I s j = g) = Pro�G I lg l = k) 
= �k, n) 
= 
= 
p k (1 _ p )° -k + p n-k ( 1  _ p )1< 
p" ( l - p) k-1 
Prob(! I sj = g) = Prob(I I l gj = k.) 
= P(n - k , n) 
pn -k (l - p )k 
= 
pk ( l - pt-k + pn -k ( l - p)k 
= Pfc-
1 ( 1 - Pi 
Thus, the expected uti lity of a vote to convict is given by: 
EU/C , g) - q i Prob(I) 
Simi larly, the expected uti l ity of a vote to acqui t i s given by: 
EUi (A . g) = - (1 - q i )Prob(G ) 
( ) p
k 
(1 - p /r.- 1 - I -q i . k. ( l )k- 1 k.- 1 (l � k. p - p + p - p; 
q i :S p � q j - pq j :S p - pq j 
� qj (l - p) s ( 1 - qi )P 
� - q/�- 1 ( 1 - p) k ;:?  - ( l - qj )pk (l - p )k- 1 
p" ( l - p f - l 
;:? (1 - q ) . . . . . J k (l �k - 1  k- 1 ( 1 �k p - p; + p - p; 
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Subcase 2: s .  = 1 J 
For this subcase, we can calculate juror j ' s  beliefs about the probabil i ty of guilt or innocence in 
the same manner as above. This gives us : 
Pr ob(G I si = i) = p' ( l - p) k-1 + pk-1 (1 - p) k 
pk ( l - p/-1 
k ( 1 )k-1 k-1 ( 1 )k p - p  + p  - p  
Thus, the expected uti l ity of a vote to convict is given by: 
- q 3 Prob(I) 
Similarly, the expected uti l i ty of a vote to acquit i s given by: 
1 - p s q j � 1 - q j - p s 0 
� 1 - q J - p + pq J s pq J 
¢:> (1 - qJ I - p) � pq 1 
¢:::> - (1 - qJpk- 1 ( 1 - p ) k � - ql p k (l - p) k- 1 
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Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2: Suppose the util ity of mistrial is equal to the expected uti l i ty of an additional 
trial before a new jury. Sincere voting is then a Nash equil ibrium in the mistrial model for any 
voting rule k if and only i f 1 -p � qj � p for all jEN. 
Proof: First note that, in a single trial, we have: 
Pr obs ( C I I ) = Pr obs (A I G) = � ( :) p n- x ( 1 - p )" 
i<-1 (n\ Pr obs (M I I) = Pr obs (M I G) = 2; \x) p0 -x (1 - pr 
This gives us: 
mG = J 
G m J = 
G m .  = .I 
G mj = 
where Q = 
x=n-k+l 
k-1 (n\ 1 - � p
n -x (1 - pr 
x = n - k + l  \ X }  
2: 0 
Simi larly , we can show that: 
m '  = q · Q  
J J 
Thus, condi tion (a) in Proposition 6 becomes: 
(r - q J I - p)2k - n-1 + ( m�p - m; (l - p)�p2 k- n- 1 _ (l - p) 2k-n- 1 ) 2 O 
( X )2k - n -l (( ) ( ))( 2k n J ( )2k- n - 1 ) p - q J 1 - p + Q 1 - ql p - q j 1 - p p - - - 1 - p 
( X \2k - n -l ( )( 2 k -n - l  ( )2k- n- l ) p - q l  1 - pJ + Q p - ql p - 1 - p 2: 0 
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2: 0 
(P _ q jX (I - P )2k -n -1 + Q( P2 k-n-1 _ ( l - p) 2k.- n-1 )) � 0 
p - q j � 0 
q j s p 
Similarly, we can show that condition (b) in Proposition 6 becomes : 
Thus, sincere voting i s a Nash equilibrium for any voting rule k if and only if 1 -p s qi s p for all 
jEN. 
Recognize that when n is odd and k = 0;1 , the conditions of this proposition are the same as the 
conditions of Proposition 1 dealing with exogenous mistrial uti l i ties. Thus, endogenizing the 
mistrial uti l i ties has no impact on the existence of the sincere voting Nash equil ibrium in this 
case. This is not surprising, since we previously showed that a mistrial wil l never occur under 
these conditions . 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3: Suppose that mistrial always results in a new trial and consider two voting rules , A A A A. k1 and k2 , with k1 < k2 •  I f jurors vote sincerely, then: 
( 1 ) The probabil i ty of convicting an innocent defendant is lower under voting rule k2 than under 
voting rule k1 . 
(2) The probability of acquitting a gui l ty defendant is lower under voting rule k2 than under 
voting rule k1 • 
Proof: First note that, due to the symmetry of the mistrial model , the probabil i ty of convicting 
an innocent defendant is equal to the probabi l i ty of acquitting a guil ty defendant. Therefore, it is 
sufficient to prove only part ( 1 ) of the proposition. 
In addition, note that it is sufficient to prove only that the probability of convicting an innocent A A 
defendant is lower under voting rule k1 + 1  than under voting rule k1 • I t i s then obvious by A A A induction that, for any voting rule k2 with k1 < k2 , the probabil i ty of convicting an innocent A A 
defendant is lower under k2 than k1 . 
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The probability of convicting an innocent defendant in (possibly) repeated trials under voting 
rule k1 is given by: 
Similarly , the probabi l i ty of convicting an innocent defendant in possibly repeated trials under 
voting rule k1 + 1  is given by: 
We now show that Pr ob�1 (c I I )  > Pr ob� 1 + 1 (c I I ) : 
(
1 - p 
)
2( x - k1 ) < p2(x-k 1 ) for any x > kl 
pki - x( l - PY-
k
' < p x-k1 ( 1 - p)
k
, -
x for any X > k 1  
( n\ n+k 1  - X (l )n+ x-kj ( n \ fi +x -k 1 (1 )fl+ k j  - X  f kA 
\ x) 
p - p < \ x ) p 
- p or any x > 1 
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< pn -fc1 (l - p )1<1 i· ( :\ { Pn- x (l - pY + px (l - pr- x ) 
x=k1 +1 
\ } 
( pn- f 1 ( l - p)1' 1  + pf 1 (l - pr-k 1 + i r :\) (Pn-x.( l - pr + px (l - pf -x )l _i ( :)pn- x( l � pf \ x= k 1 + 1 \ ) x-k 1 + 1  
< ( pn-k 1 (1 - p) k 1 + ± ( n \ pn -x (l - pf J ± (n\ (if-x (l - pt + Jf (l - pf-x ) 
\ ·  x=k 1 +1 \ x ) ) x=k 1 + 1 \x) 
j: ( n\ {P n-x (l - pY + px (l - pr- x ) · 
















i ( n\ { Pn- x (l - p )" + p x (l - pr-x ) i ( n\ {P n-x ( l - pr + p x (l - pr-x ) 
x=k 1 + l \ x) x=k 1 \ x) 
. By i
n
duction, �e have Pr ob:1 (c I I ) > Pr ob�2 (c I I ) , and since Pr obR (A I G) = Pr obR (c I I ) , 
we also have that Pr ob:1 (A I G)  > Pr ob :2 (A I G) . 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that the utility of mistrial i s  equal to the expected util ity of an additional 
"" ,,... ,... ,.. 
trial before a new jury and consider two voti
n
g rules, k1 and k2 , with k1 < k2 . If jurors vote 
sincerely, then the ex ante expected uti l ity for an juror is higher under voting rule k2 than under 
voting rule k1 . 
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Proof: Note that it i s  sufficient to prove only that the ex ante expected uti l ity is higher under A A 
voting rule k1 + 1 than under voting rule k1 • I t  is then obvious by induction that, for any voting A A A A A 
rule k2 with k1 < k2 , the expected uti l ity is higher under k2 than under k1 . 
I f  all jurors vote sincerely, the ex ante expected util ity for juror j under voting rule k1 when the 
defendant is guilty i s  given by: 
A 
Similarly , we can show that the ex ante expected uti l i ty for juror j under voting rule k1 when the 
defendant is innocent is given by: 
Thus, the overal l ex ante expected uti l i ty for juror j under voting rule k1 is given by: 
3 1  
= 
Similarly ,  the overall ex ante expected utility for juror j under voting rule k1 + 1  i s  given by: 
( 1 - p)2( x-i<, ) < p2(x-k i ) for any x > k1 
pk1 - x( l - py-k1 < px-k' (l - p) k,- x for any x > k 1 
( Il\ u+ k, - x(l )n+ x- k, ( n \ u +x-k , (1 )n+k , - x .. k� \ x} p 
- p < \ x}
p - p 1 or any x > 1 
i ( Il\ pn+ k1 - x ( l - p)° +x-k1 < i ( Il\ pn +x-k 1 ( l - p)°+k1 - x  
x =k, + 1 \ x} x=k, + l \ x} 
i ( :\ ( p2 n- k, - x ( l - p ) ki  + x + pn +k, - x (l - p r +x -k , ) 




� (n\ n- x( l - )x 
4 \ x)
p p 
x = k1 
By induction, we have EU l k2 ) > EU j ( k1 ) .  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5: Let the jurors be numbered such that q 1  :S; qz :S; • • •  :S; �-i :S; qn . Then the s incere A 
revelation strategy profile i s a subgame perfect Nash equil ibrium for a given voting rule k i f  and 
only if one of the following conditions i s  true: 
(a) () :S; q lt :$ (3(0,n) ; 
(b) (3 ( n ,n) < q lt :S; 1 ;  or 
(c) 3k*E{ l ,  . . . , n}  such that f3(k* - 1 ,n) :S; qj :S; f3(k* ,n) for all jEN. 
Proof: First recognize that a strategic voter will condition her strategies in both the preliminary 
and final votes on the event that her vote is pivotal ; that is , that her vote can change the trial 
outcome. I n the event that her vote is not pivotal , her util ity is unaffected by her vote and 
therefore such situations have no implications for strategic behavior. 
We will evaluate strategy in the final vote first and then work backwards to examine the 
prel iminary vote. 
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Final Vote Strategy: 
Assume that in the preliminary vote, �(g)= l and �(i)=O for all jurors jEN. Further assume that 
all j urors J=N vote to convict in the final vote iff f3(k,n)� qj , where k i s  the number of votes to 
convict from the preliminary vote. We must show that no juror has an incentive to deviate from 
this strategy in the final vote. 
Note that, since all jurors vote sincerely in the preliminary vote, all j urors will know the total 
number of guilty (g) and innocent (i) signals before taking the final - vote. Thus , all jurors will 
have the same estimate of the probabil i ty that the defendant i s gui l ty, namely f3(k,n) . 
For any given j uror, we need only consider the situation in which the juror ' s  vote i s  pivotal . That 
is , if the given j uror votes to convict, the defendant will be convicted, and if the given j uror votes 
to acquit, the defendant will be acquitted. Thus, for any juror j ,  the expected uti l ity of voting to 
acquit in this case is given by: 
EU( A l jg j = k) = - ( 1 - q j ) · Prob( GI jg j = k) 
= - (1 - qJ · f3 (k , n ) 
Similarly ,  the expected uti l i ty of voting to convict i s given by: 
EU( cl jg l = k) = - q j · Prot{II jg l = k) 
= - q j • ( 1 - f3( k, n)) 
Therefore, juror j will want to vote to convict iff: 
EU(CI jg j = k) � EU(A I jg j = k ) 
-qj · Prot{ I l l g l = k ) � - ( 1 - qj ) ·Prob(G l jg j = k ) 
-qj · ( l - f3(k, n )) � - (1 - qJ · f3( k, n) 
qj · ( l - f3( k, n )) s ( 1 - qJ ·fX k, n) 
q j - qJ�( k, n ) s f3( k , n ) - q jf3( k, n ) 
q j s fX k, n )  
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Therefore, sophisticated sincere voting in the final vote is a Nash equilibrium for this subgame. 
Recognize that this resul t  i s  dependent only upon the assumption of sincere voting in the 
preliminary vote is independent of satisfaction or violation of conditions (a) , (b) , and (c) . 
Preliminaiy Vote Strategy: 
Now assume that all jurors jEN vote to convict in the final vote iff (3(k,n);:::: qj , where k is the 
number of votes to convict from the preliminary vote. Further assume that aj( g)= 1 and Oj(i )=O 
for all jurors jEN in the preliminary vote. We must show that, if one of the conditions, (a) , (b), 
or (c) , is satisfied, then no juror has an incentive to deviate from this sincere voting strategy in 
the preliminary vote. We must also show that, if all three conditions are violated, then at least 
one juror has an incentive to deviate from sincerity in the preliminary vote. 
Case 1 :  Condition (a) i s  satisfied 
A 
In  this case, we have that 0 :::;; q1 :::;; • • •  :::;; q k: :::;; (3 (0,n) . This means that, in the final vote , at least k 
j urors will always vote to convict, and the defendant will thus always be convicted, regardless of 
the outcome of the preliminary vote . Therefore, no juror has a positive incentive to deviate from 
sincerity in the preliminary vote. 
Case 2: Condition (b) is satisfied 
In this case, we have that (3(n,n) :::;; q k. :::;; • • .  :::;; q0 :::;; 1 for all jEN. This means that, in the final vote, 
at l east n- k+ 1 jurors will always vote to acquit, and the defendant will thus always be acquitted, 
regardless of the outcome of the preliminary vote. Therefore, no j uror has a positive incentive to 
deviate from sincerity in the preliminary vote. 
Case 3: Condition (c) is satisfied 
In this case, we have that 3k*E{ l ,  . . .  , n} such that � (k* - 1 ,n) :::;; qj :::;; (3(k" ,n) for all jEN. Thus, if 
j uror j is pivotal in the preliminary vote, this means that lg l_Fk* - 1 . In other words, if j uror j votes 
C in the preliminary vote , all other jurors will vote C in the final vote, and if juror j votes A in 
the preliminary vote, all other j urors will vote A in the final vote. 
Note that this means that if j uror j is pivotal in the preliminary vote, j uror j can completely 
dictate the final trial outcome through her preliminary vote . Even under unanimity rule, j uror j 's 
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prel iminary vote will determine the final vote of all other jurors , thus allowing j uror j to choose 
the trial outcome with her final vote. Thus, we can say that a j uror will prefer to vote C in the 
preliminary vote if and only if she prefers that the defendant be convicted in the final outcome 
(i . e. , EU( cl lg l_j = k * -1 ) � EU(AI jg l_j = k * - 1)) 
Now suppose that s j=i . In this case, we have that: 
EU(Cl jgLj = k * - 1 ) = EU(q jg j = .k * - 1) = - q.i · ( l - f3(k * -1, n)) 
EU(Al jg l_j = k * -1 ) = EU(Al lgl = k * - 1) · =  - ( 1 - q .i ) · f3 (k * -1, n) 
13{ k * - 1 , n) < q j => f3(k * - 1, n ) - q j · j3( k * - 1, n ) < q j - q j · f3 (k * - 1 , n ) 
� - ( 1 - q .i ) · J3(k * - 1,n ) > - q j · (l - J3( k * - 1 , n)) 
=> EU(Al l gj_j = k * - 1) > Eu(c1 1 g1_j = k * - 1) 
Now suppose that s .i=g. In this case, we have that: 
EU(Cl jgLj = k * - 1 ) = Eu(q jgj = k * ) = - q j · (l - f3( k* , n)) 
EU(Al lg l _j = k * - 1 ) = EU(Al jg j = k * ) = - (1 - q j ) · f3( k* , n) 
13{ k* , n) � q j => f3( k* , n) - q i · j3 (k * , n ) � q i - q j · f3(k* , n) 
=> ( 1 - q j ) · f3 (k* , n) � q j · ( 1 - 13{k* , n)) 
=> - (1 - q j ) · f3 (k* , n )  s - qi · ( 1 - f3( k* , n)) 
=> EU(AI lgLj = k * - 1 ) s Eu(q jgj _.i = k * - 1) 
Thus, a j uror j will pref er to vote to convict in the preliminary vote if and only if s i=g . 
Case 4:  Condi tions (a) ,  (b) ,  and (c) are al l  violated 
Violation of conditions (a) and (b) means that 3k*E{ l ,  . . .  , n} such that j3(k* - 1 ,n) < q i.: :::; f3 (k" ,n) . 
For a given juror j to be pivotal in the preliminary vote, i t  therefore means that lg l _i=k* - 1 . 
Violation of condition (c) means that q 1  < f3 (k* - 1 ,n) and/or f3 (k* ,n) < q0 • 
Suppose q1 < j3 (k' - l ,n) and consider the situation in which juror 1 is pivotal (i .e . ,  l g l_1 =k"- 1 ) and 
s 1 = i .  If juror 1 votes A in the preliminary vote ( i .e . , votes sincerely) , the defendant will be 
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acquitted, since f3 (k* - 1 ,n) < q . . However, if juror 1 instead deviates and votes C, the defendant 
k 
will be convicted, since q k.  � f3(k* ,n) . Since q1 < f3(k*- l ,n) , juror 1 prefers that the defendant i s  
convicted, and therefore juror 1 has a positive incentive to deviate and vote C. 
Now suppose f3(k* ,n) < qn and consider the situation in which juror n is pivotal ( i .e. , l gl-0=k* - l )  
and sn = g .  If juror n votes C i n  the preliminary vote ( i .e. , votes sincerely) , the defendant will be 
convicted, since q k. � f3(k* ,n) . However, if juror n instead deviates and votes A,  the defendant 
will acquitted, since f3 (k* - 1 ,n) < q k. . Since f3(k* ,n) < �' juror n prefers that the defendant is 
acqui tted, and therefore juror n has a positive incentive to deviate and vote A. 
Thus, if conditions (a) , (b) , and (c) are all violated, then sincere voting is not a Nash equil ibrium 
in the preliminary vote. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 6: For n odd, the sincere revelation strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash A 
equil ibrium for any voting rule k if: 
For n even, the sincere revelation strategy profi le i s a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for any A 
voting rule k if: 
2 (1 - p)
2 
2 s q i  s 0.5, 'v'j EN p2 + ( 1 - p) 
or 0.5 s qi s 2 
p 
2 , 'v'j EN .  
p + (1 - p )  
For any value of n ,  odd or even, the sincere revelation strategy profile i s  a subgame perfect Nash A 
equi l ibrium for any voting rule k if: 
1 -p � qi � 0.5, 'v'jEN or 0.5 � qi �  p, 'v'jEN .  
Proof: First, suppose that n is odd. Proposi tion 5 says that the sincere revelation strategy profile 
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for any voting rule k if: 
f3( n;1 , n) s q i  s f3( n;1 , n) , 'v'jEN. 
This condition i s  equivalent to: 
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n -1 • + l  n +1 n - 1  
p2 (1 - p)2 + p2 (1 - p )2 
.uJ &.;.l. p 1 . (1 - p) 2 
n - 1 • + l  n + l  n - 1  
p2 (1 - p)T + p 2 (1 - p)2 
1 - p  p 
s q j s 1 - p + p 1 - p + p 
1 - p s q j s p 
Now, suppose that n is even. Proposition 5 says that the sincere revelation strategy profile is a � 
subgame perfect Nash equil ibrium for any voting rule k if: 
�-! - 1, n) s q j s f3(-! , n) , 'v'j E N  or f3 (t , n) s q j s f3(¥ + 1, n ), 'v'j E N .  
The first of these two conditions i s  equivalent to: 
The second of these two conditions is equivalent to: 
II. • p '  (1 - p) 2 
Now recognize that for pE(0.5, 1 .0) , we have that 1 -2p < 0 and p- 1 < 0. This gives us: 
(p - 1X 1 - 2p) > o => 3p - 2p2 - 1 > o 





p2 + ( 1 - p)
2 
p2 
2 > p 
p 2 + (1 - p) 
38 
1 - 2p  < 0 =:::> 1 < 2p 
=:::> p < 2p2 
=:::> p + 1 - p < 2p2 + 1 - p 
=:::> 1 - p < p2 + (1 - p )2 
=:::> 
1 - p  
< 1 
p 2 + (1 - p) 2 
=:::> 
(1 - p) 2 < 1 - p 
p2 + (1 - p)
2 
Now we can combine the conditions for both odd and even n that are given above. Doing so, we 
see that, for any value of n, odd or even, the sincere revelation strategy profile is a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium for any voting rule k if: 
1 -p � qj � 0.5, 'v'jEN or 0.5 � qj � p, 'v'jEN .  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 7: Suppose the juror util ities satisfy 0.5 � q 1 � q2 � • • •  � qn- l � qn . If condition (a) , 
(b) , or (c) from Proposition 5 i s satisfied under voting rule k1 ,  then the same condition i s  A A A 
satisfied under any other voting rule k2 satisfying k2> k1 . 
Proof: Suppose condition (a) is satisfied for voting rule k1 . This means that 
(1 - p) ° 
0 � q - � j) (O,n) = n < 0.5. k 1  pn + ( l - p) 
Since qi � 0.5 for al l j ,  condition (a) can not be satisfied for k1 , and therefore the proposition is 
satisfied vacuously in this case. 
Now suppose condition (b) i s satisfied for voting rule k1 .  This means that j3 (n,n) < q - � l .  
ki 
Since k1 < k2 , we have that q - < q - , and thus that �(n ,n) < q - � 1 .  Therefore, condi tion (b) i s  k i  k , k 2 
al so satisfied for voting rule k 2 . 
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Finally, suppose that condition (c) i s  satisfied for voting rule k 1 • In this case, the condition is A 
completely independent of the voting rule, thus condition (c) i s also sati sfied for voting rule k 2 • 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 8: Suppose that the sincere revelation strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash A A 
equil ibrium for two voting rules, k1 and k2 • I f  jurors behave according to this Nash equil ibrium, 
then: 
( I )  The probability of convicting an innocent defendant i s  the same under both voting rules. 
(2) The probabili ty of acquitting a guilty defendant i s  the same under both voting rules . 
A A 
Proof: Without loss of generali ty, assume k1 :s: k2 • Existence of the sincere voting Nash 
equilibrium means that one of the three Proposition . 5  conditions, (a) ,  (b) ,  or (c) , is satisfied for A A 
each of the voting rules k1 and k2 • I t  is also straightforward to show that both rules must satisfy 
the same condition (to see this , follow the same approach as used in the proof of Proposition 7) . 
A A 
Suppose both rules satisfy condition (a) .  In this case, 0 :::;; qj :::;; �(0,n) for j= l ,2, . . .  , k1 , . . .  , k2 • Thus, 
at least k2 jurors will always vote to convict in the final vote regardless of the outcome of the 
preliminary vote and regardless of the voting rule . Therefore, all defendants are convicted under 
both voting rules, and the probability of trial error under both voting rules is simply 0.5 (the prior 
probabil ity that the defendant is innocent) . 
A � 
Now suppose both rules satisfy condition (b) .  In this case , � (n,n) :::;; qj :::;; 1 for j= k1 '  . . . , k2 ,  • • •  ,n. 
Thus, no more than k1 j urors will ever vote to convict in the final vote regardless of the outcome 
of the prel iminary vote and regardless of the voting rule . Therefore, al l defendants are acquitted 
under both voting rules, and the probability of trial error under both voting rules i s  simply 0.5 
(the prior probability that the defendant is gui lty) . 
Finally suppose both rules sati sfy condition (c) . In this case, 3k*E{ l ,  . . . , n} such that � (k* - 1 ,n) :s: 
qj :s: � (k* ,n) for all jEN. Recall that the number of votes to convict in the preliminary vote will be 
equal to l g I in equil ibrium. Thus , i f  l g  l �k · ,  al l jurors will vote to convict in the final vote, and if 
l g l <k* , all jurors will vote to acquit in the final vote. S ince all final votes are unanimous, if a 
defendant i s convicted under one voting rule, she would also be convicted under the other voting 
rule . Therefore, the probabil i ty of convicting an innocent defendant must be the same under both 
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voting rules. Similarly, if a defendant i s  acquitted under one voting rule, she would also be 
acquitted under the other voting rule. Therefore, the probabil i ty of acquitting a guilty defendant 
must also be the same under both voting rules. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 9: Suppose the subgame perfect Nash equil ibrium described in Proposition 1 exists � � 
for any two voting mles, k1 and k2 • If jurors behave according to this Nash equil ibrium, then 
the expected utility for any juror is the same under both voting rules. 
Proof: I n  the proof of Proposition 8, we showed that the trial outcome will always be the same 
under both voting rules. Therefore, the expected uti lity (and, in fact, the final real ized utility) 
must be the same under both voting rules , also. 
Q.E.D. 
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